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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
INSURER'S LIABILITY FOR REFUSAL TO SETTLE
A is insured by B insurance company for $10,000. Subse-
quently, X is injured by A and brings an action against A for an
amount in excess of $10,000. Query: If X is willing to settle with
B insurance company for an amount within the limits of A's policy,
what are the rights and duties of B company in considering the
compromise offer? There appears to be no definitive answer to
this question. Some jurisdictions state that the insurer has absolute
discretionary powers in deciding whether to accept compromise
demands I while others state that the insurer is bound to give at
least some, if not equal, consideration to the insured's interest.
The majority viewpoint favors the position that the insurer
must consider the insured's interest along with its own when con-
sidering whether to accept a compromise demand within the policy
limits.3 However, whether the insurer will be liable for a judgment
rendered against the insured in excess of the policy coverage de-
pends upon a determination of how the insurer-insured interest
relationship should be balanced. Within this determination lies
the subsidiary question of whether the insurer should be liable for an
excess judgment if merely negligent, or whether its liability should
be limited to a showing of "bad faith." Although the majority
rule is that the insured can only recover if the insurer has acted
in "bad faith" in refusing to effect a compromise within the policy
limits,4 the critical problem still remains as to what constitutes
"bad faith."
It is the purpose of this note to scrutinize the relationship of
the insurer and insured to determine what elements are necessary
to impose liability on the insurer (with almost complete emphasis
on the issue of "bad faith"), and, finally, to determine whether the
I See, e.g., Long v. Union Indem. Co., 277 Mass. 428, 178 N.E. 737
(1931) ; Mears Mining Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 162 Mo. App. 178, 144
S.W. 883 (1912).
2 Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Robb, 267 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1959) ; Kinder v.
Western Pioneer Ins. Co., 231 Cal. App. 2d 894, 42 Cal. Rptr. 394 (1965);
Cowden v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 389 Pa. 459, 134 A.2d 223 (1957). It
has been suggested that the insurer be held absolutely liable if he fails
to negotiate a settlement demand within the policy limits, but apparently no
court has been willing to accept this position. See Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d
168, 172-73, 177 (1955), which provides a summary of the case law in
the area of insurer bad faith. See also Keeton, Liability Insurance and
Responsibility for Settlement, 67 HARv. L. Rlv. 1136 (1954).
3 Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 168, 170-71 (1955).
- Cunningham, Liability in Excess of Policy Limits, 1957 INs. L.J. 483.
It was predicted in 1942 that the majority view would become one that
allowed mere negligence for failure to settle to be the controlling factor.
See J. APPLEMAN, INSURANcE LAW AND PRAcTIcE § 4712 (1942). How-
ever, this trend never materialized. See Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 168 (1955).
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courts are handling the situation in the most advantageous and
equitable manner possible both for the insurer and the insured.
The Duty of the Insurer
The usual insurance policy provides:
With respect to such insurance as is afforded by this policy . the
company shall . . . defend any suit against the insured alleging
such injury . . . and seeking damages on account thereof, even if
such suit is groundless, false, or fraudulent; but the company may
make such investigation and settlement of any claim or suit as it
deems expedient.5
As such, the insurer appears to have the exclusive right to defend
and settle claims which arise against the insured. In determining
the duty of the insurer to effect settlements, case law has evidenced
varying approaches ranging from that which allows the insurer to
give paramount consideration to its own interests 6 to that which
requires that in certain circumstances the insurer must subordinate
its own interests to those of the insured.7 It appears, however, that
the majority viewpoint today is that the insurance company's and
the insured's interests should be equally weighed.8
Admitting the insurer's duty to concern himself with the in-
sured's interests, the liability of the insurance company for the
amount of a judgment against the insured in excess of the policy
limit arises from the insurer's failure to adhere to the express or
implied provisions of the insurance contract.9 Thus, whether one
characterizes the insurer's position vis-a'-vis the insured as that
of agent or independent contractor, the insurer will be held liable
if it fails to adequately consider the insured's interests.1°
1 E. PATrmsON & W. YOUNG, CASES ON INsuRANcE 698 (4th ed. 1961).6 Abrams v. Factory Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 298 Mass. 141, 10 N.E.2d 82
(1937).
7 Zumw-alt v. Utilities Ins. Co., 360 Mo. 362, 228 S.W.2d 750 (1960).
8 Hernandez v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 346 F.2d 154 (5th Cir.
1965); Kinder v. Western Pioneer Ins. Co., 231 Cal. App. 2d 894, 42 Cal.
Rptr. 394 (1965). In Kinder, the court stated that the insurer must give at
least as much consideration to the insured's interest as it does to its own.
0 Ivy v. Pacific Auto. Ins. Co., 156 Cal. App. 2d 652, 320 P.2d 140
(1958); Sweeten v. National Mut. Ins. Co., 233 Md. 52, 194 A.2d 817 (1963).
Thus, the insurer has committed a tortious act by failing to perform its
contractual agreement. "Ordinarily, a breach of contract is not a tort, but
a contract may create the state of things which furnishes the occasion of a
tort. ... Accompanying every contract is a common-law duty to perform
with care, skill, reasonable expedience, and faithfulness the thing agreed
to be done, and a negligent failure to observe any of these conditions is a
tort, as well as a breach of the contract." 38 Am. Jun. Negligence § 20
(1941).
10 See G.A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indem Co., 15 S.W.2d
544 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1929), aff'd, 39 S.W.2d 957 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931)
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There are two bases upon which liability of an insurer for
a judgment in excess of policy coverage may be predicated: negli-
gence and "bad faith." "I Under the negligence theory, which is the
minority rule,12 an insurer is held negligent for refusing to settle
within the policy limits when it fails to exercise that degree of
care which an ordinary person would exercise in the management
of his own business.13 This ultimately becomes a jury question.
The liability of the insurance company is dependent upon whether
the jury determines that the insurer neglected to concern itself
with the insured's interest either wilfully or as the result of an
unjustifiable mistake of fact. For example, in Douglas v. United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,'4 insurer's contention that he
had no reason to believe the insured to be liable was rejected.
The court held that plaintiff-insured had introduced sufficient
evidence to raise a jury question as to whether defendant-in-
surer's claims adjuster had knowledge of the pertinent facts. There-
fore, the jury was justified in finding that the adjuster knew the
facts, and on agency principles his knowledge was imputed to
the insurer. Defendant insurer could not claim justifiable ignorance
of the insured's liability for negligence, and was held liable for
the judgment in excess of the policy limits.
For purposes of the majority rule,'5 "bad faith" has been
defined as an intentional disregard of the financial interests of the
insured in the hope of escaping the full responsibility imposed by
the policy provisions.' 6 This definition has, at times, been so
liberally construed that the insurer has been held liable for the
amount of the judgment in excess of the policy limit even though
he has not intentionally disregarded the insured's interest.'7  How-
ever, in contrast to the negligence theory, the "bad faith" rule ap-
(insurer considered agent of insured and held liable); Attleboro Mfg. Co.
v. Frankfort Marine Acc. & Plate Glass Ins. Co., 240 F. 573 (1st Cir.
1917) (insurer considered independent contractor and held liable).
"'See generally Radcliffe v. Franklin Nat'l Ins. Co., 208 Ore. 1, 298
P.2d 1102 (1956), where the court reviewed many cases involving the bad
faith and negligence tests.
12 Cunningham, ,mpra note 4.
13See Douglas v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 81 N.H. 371, 127
A. 708 (1924).
1481 N.H. 371, 127 A. 708 (1924).
35 Cunningham, supra note 4.
16 Johnson v. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co., 109 Vt. 481, 1 A.2d 817 (1938).
See also American Fid. & Cas. Co. v. Greyhound Corp., 258 F.2d 709 (5th
Cir. 1958); Southern Fire & Cas. Co. v. Norris, 36 Tenn. App. 657, 250
S.W.2d 785 (1952).
'17Potomac Ins. Co. v. Wilkins Co., 376 F.2d 425 (10th Cir. 1967).
Also important is the fact that acting in bad faith and perpetrating a fraud
are not equivalent. Rather, what is emphasized is the failure of the insurer
to meet its contractual obligation to safeguard the insured's interest. Cer-
nocky v. Indem. Ins. Co., 69 Ill. App. 2d 196, 216 N.E.2d 198 (1966).
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pears to be more favorable to the insurer, in that conduct imposing
liability on the insurer for negligence will not necessarily impose
liability for "bad faith." is
Although the "bad faith" theory predominates in most jurisdic-
tions, it is nevertheless important not to overlook the negligence
concept both because of its application in certain minority jurisdic-
tions and, even where the courts apply what is termed the
"bad faith" test, the issue of negligence plays an important role
in determining liability.' 9
It would also appear that a primary consideration in determin-
ing whether the insurer has acted negligently or in "bad faith" is
whether the insurer would have accepted a compromise offer if
an unlimited liability policy had been issued. 20  As stated in Kuz-
mnanich v. United Fire & Casuadty Co., "in determining
whether to settle claims against the insured, the insurer must act
as if it were liable for the entire judgment that might eventu-
ally be entered against the insured." 21
The "Bad Faith" Rule
Because most jurisdictions predicate liability upon the "bad
faith" acts of the insurer, it is necessary to analyze and determine
what specific acts constitute "bad faith." Generally speaking, as long
as the insurer acts in a reasonable manner, with an intelligent
knowledge of the law and facts governing the particular situation
he is not liable for the excess amount of a subsequent judgment
against the insured.22 However, at times, the insurer has been held
liable under the "bad faith" test under circumstances where its
conduct could not be easily characterized as unreasonable. Thus, in
Potomac Insurance Co. v. Wilkins Co.,23 the insurer was held
liable for the amount of an excess judgment even though the
court found that he had made a diligent investigation of the acci-
dent and had concluded that the company was free from negli-
gence. With an apparent emphasis on the insurer's duty to the
insured, the court stated:
'sBrown v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 314 F.2d 675, 680 (2d
Cir. 1963).
29American Fid. & Cas. Co. v. Greyhound Corp., 258 F.2d 709 (5th
Cir. 1958); Note, Insurer's Liability Exceeding Policy Limits, 7 DRAKE
L. Rv. 23, 25-27 (1958).
20 See Davy v. Public Natl Ins. Co., 181 Cal. App. 2d 387, 5 Cal. Rptr.
408 (1960); Radio Taxi Serv., Inc. v. Lincoln Mut. Ins. Co., 31 N.J. 299,
157 A2d 319 (1960).
21242 Ore. 529, 532, 410 P.2d 812, 813 (1966).
22 See Appleman, Duty of a Liability Insurer to Coinpromise Litigation,
26 N.Y.L.J. 100 (1938) ; Holzendorff, Liability of Insurer's Re 'Excess Judg-
ment', 18 OKLA. B.A.J. 1732 (1947).
23376 F.2d 425 (10th Cir. 1967).
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But certainly the defendant and its counsel realized that there was
always the chance that their judgment and opinion would be wrong,
and that this case could result in a verdict, and if they did, they
certainly were advised of the probabilities that there would be a very
substantial excess judgment.24
While there are no definitive standards for determining "bad
faith" with each case depending to a great extent upon its own
facts, certain factors appear fairly universal and, thus, provide
a reasonable guide in determining what is meant by "bad faith." 25
The factors which contribute to a finding of "bad faith" may be
categorized as follows:
(1) failure of the insurer to give a "qualified" consideration
to the settlement offer made by the injured party; (2) failure to
properly consider the fact that the insurance contract is for the
benefit of the insured; (3) active or passive acts by the insurer
evidencing what may be considered as acute negligence or wil-
ful and wanton conduct; (4) failure of the insurer to act reason-
ably in light of past policy decisions.
Failure of Insurer to Give a "Qualified" Consideration to the
Settlement Offer Made by the Injured Party
An insurer gives "qualified" consideration to a settlement de-
mand when its decision is, based upon adequate knowledge of the
facts and law. Therefore, if the insurer fails properly to investi-
gate and prepare for the case, it cannot claim to have acted in
a "qualified" manner in refusing to settle.26 In American M rutial
Liability Insurance Co. v. Cooper,27 the insurer's liability for the
amount of the judgment in excess of the policy coverage was pre-
dicated upon the insurer's failure to investigate. The insurer had
failed to interview witnesses, had ignored counsel's recommenda-
tion to settle, and had neglected to make any effort to determine
the creditability of the alleged claim against the insured. As such,
the court stated that the insurer was not in a position to act
intelligently, or in fairness to the insured, when it rejected the
compromise offer. Moreover, if the insurer refuses to adhere to
its attorney's advice or its adjuster's assessment of liability when
the facts demand such adherence, its "qualified" position may be
24 Id. at 427.
25 See Jessen v. O'Daniel, 210 F. Supp. 317, 326-27 (D. Mont. 1962),
where it is stated that although bad faith is to be judged on a case-by-case
method, there are certain factors fairly common to many bad faith claims.2GAmerican Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Cooper, 61 F.2d 446 (5th Cir. 1932),
cert. denied, 289 U.S. 736 (1933); Kohlstedt v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins.
Co., 139 N.W.2d 184 (Iowa 1965).
2761 F.2d 446 (5th Cir. 1932).
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in doubt. s Furthermore, when the extent of injuries to the claimant
are such that their seriousness establishes the possibility of a
judgment in excess of policy coverage, the insurer cannot be held
to have acted in a "qualified" manner if, in refusing settlement,
it fails to have knowledge of such extensive injuries.2 9
Failure to Properly Consider the Fact that the Insurance Contract
is for the Benefit of the Insured
When the insurer refuses to inform the insured of the facts
of the case so that the insured might take affirmative steps for his
own protection, "bad faith" may be evidenced.30 And, likewise, "bad
faith" mnay be predicated upon the failure of the insurer to notify
the insured of a compromise demand.3' Thus, in Brown v. Guaran-
tee Insurance Co.,32 it was stated that it is the insurer's duty to
inform the insured of such a demand.
In addition, when the insurer is presented with an opportu-
nity to settle after a judgment has been rendered in excess of the
policy limits against the insured, a refusal to accept the compromise
demand may be evidence of "bad faith." 33 Olympic Fields Coun-
try Club v. Bankers Indemnity Insurance Co.,34 indicates that an
insurer's unreasonable refusal to settle both before and after
judgment is rendered against the insured, contrary to the advice
of its own attorney, will render an insurer liable for a judgment
in excess of the policy coverage on the grounds of "bad faith."
2s Brown v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 319 P.2d 69 (1957) ;
Olympia Fields Country Club v. Bankers Indem. Ins. Co., 325 Ill. App.
649, 60 N.E.2d 896 (1945).29 Roberts v. American Fire & Cas. Co., 89 F. Supp. 827 (M.D. Tenn.
1950). See also Henke v. Iowa Home Mut Cas. Co., 250 Iowa 1123, 97
N.W.2d 168 (1959), where it is stated that an insurance company cannot
refuse to settle within the policy limits if it has less than a fifty-fifty chance
of winning and the verdict will, without a doubt, exceed the policy limit30 Hilker v. Western Auto. Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 1, 231 N.W. 257, aff'd,
235 NA . 413 (1931).
37 Brown v. Guar. Ins. Co., 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 319 P.2d 69
(1957). But see Kleinschmitt v. Farmers Mut. Hail Ins. Ass'n, 101 F.2d
987 (8th Cir. 1939), where it is stated that when the insurance policy does
not provide for notice to the insured of a compromise offer, the failure of
the insurer to give such notice, standing alone, does not constitute bad faith.
32 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 319 P.2d 69 (1957) (dictum).
33See Roberts v. American Fire & Cas. Co., 89 F. Supp. 827 (M.D.
Tenn. 1950), aff'd, 186 F.2d 921 (6th Cir. 1951); Olympia Fields Country
Club v. Bankers Inderm. Ins. Co., 325 Ill. App. 649, 60 N.E.2d 896 (1945)
(dictum). It should be recognized, however, that bad faith is not inferred
merely because the settlement offer followed judgment, since the insurer
may have a meritorious appeal. Hazelrigg v. American Fid. & Cas. Co.,
228 F.2d 953 (10th Cir. 1955), aff'd on rehearing, 241 F.2d 871 (10th Cir.
1957).
34 325 111. App. 649, 60 N.E.2d 896 (1945).
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Finally, where the court finds that the insurer has been in
essence "gambling" with the insured's money, "bad faith" may be
found.3" The concept of "gambling" in such cases is based upon
the comparative financial risks involved. Thus, where the insurer
stands to lose very little and the insured stands to become deeply
indebted by the insurer's choice of litigating rather than settling
for an amount within the policy limit, the insurer may be guilty
of "gambling" since, as a practical matter, all it stands to lose
if a judgment is rendered in excess of the policy limits is the
insured's money.36
Active or Passive Acts by the Insurer Evincing What May be
Considered Acute Negligence or Wilful and Wanton Conduct
In this category fall acts both of the insurer and his agents.
For example, the failure of the company's adjusters to inform the
insurer that a large adverse verdict is expected has been con-
sidered to constitute "bad faith" on agency principles.3 7 Also, the
undue delay of the insurer in effecting settlement, 3  as well as
the insurer's failure to adequately authorize its agents or, at times,
the insured to settle,39 have been considered as evidence tending
to establish "bad faith." Thus, in Vanderbilt University v. Hartford
Accident & Indemnity Co.,40  when the insurer realized from
the facts that a large judgment in excess of the policy limits was
probable and made no attempt over a long period of time to effect
a settlement after repeated demands by the injured party, such
undue delay constituted "bad faith." In Noshey v. American Auto-
mobile Insurance Co.,41 the insurer, admitting possible liability,
was held liable for failing to carry out an oral agreement to author-
ize the insured to compromise the claim where the insurance policy
prohibited such settlement without written authorization from the
insurer.
In addition, courts have stated that the failure of the insurer
to settle because of the insured's refusal to contribute to the settle-
35 See Springer v. Citizens Cas. Co., 246 F.2d 123 (5th Cir. 1957).36 See Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 168, 220-24 (1955), which contains an analysis
of the comparative financial risks involved in cases of this type.
37 Johnson v. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co., 109 Vt. 481, 1 A.2d 817 (1938),
where emphasis was placed upon the fact that the failure to inform the
insurer resulted in a refusal by the insurer to settle for a favorable amount.
38 Vanderbilt Univ. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 109 F. Supp. 565
(M.D. Tenn. 1952), aff'd, 218 F.2d 818 (6th Cir. 1954).
89Noshey v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 68 F.2d 808 (6th Cir. 1934)
(insurer failed to authorize insured to settle) ; American Mut. Liah. Ins. Co.
v. Cooper, 61 F.2d 446 (5th Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 289 U.S. 736 (1933)
(insurer failed to authorize its agent to settle).
40 109 F. Supp. 565 (M.D. Tenn. 1952), aff'd, 218 F.2d 818 (6th Cir.
1954).
4168 F.2d 808 (6th Cir. 1934).
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ment offer may constitute "bad faith." 42 For example, in Lamfer-
man v. Maryland Casualty Co.,43 where there was a reasonable
belief by the insurer that a judgment would be rendered in excess
of the insured's policy coverage, the insistence that the insured
contribute toward the amount demanded as a condition to settle-
ment constituted action which warranted a finding of insurer
"bad faith."
Furthermore, when the insurer disregarded the interests of
its policy holder because of the insured's race, religion or nation-
ality, such prejudice was indicative of "bad faith. 4 4 And, evidence
that the insurer had told the insured to transfer his property in
order to avoid excess liability has also been considered to establish
insurer liability for the amount of the judgment in excess of
policy coverage.
4 5
Failure of the Insurer to Act Reasonably in Light of Past Policy
Decisions
Although, due to the necessity of adhering to the particular
factual pattern of each case, past actions are anything but con-
trolling, they are, nonetheless, a contributing factor in determining
whether one has acted in "bad faith." Therefore, when the insurer
has an established policy of settling claims, this should have some
weight in determining liability for refusal to settle.46  Also, the
fact that the insurer has or has not been subject to liability in
the past for refusing to settle should give some indication as to
its good or bad faith. Thus, in Berk v. Milwaukee Automobile
Insurance Co.,47 the court rejected the insured's contention that
the insurer's attorneys and adjusters had acted in "bad faith" for
failing to conclude that the insured was negligent. Recognizing
that the insurer's investigators and attorneys were men of wide
experience and recognized ability who had handled thousands of
lawsuits and that never before had a single charge of "bad faith"
been made against the insurance company, the court considered it
to be both reasonable and natural for the insurer to rely, in this
instance, upon the judgment of its attorneys and adjusters.
42Maryland Cas. Co. v. Cook-O'Brien Constr. Co., 69 F.2d 462 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 569 (1934); Lamferman v. Maryland Cas. Co.,
222 Wis. 406, 267 N.W. 300 (1936).
43 222 Wis. 406, 267 N.W. 300 (1936). In respect to this, however, a
1957 Kentucky case has implied that such action by the insurer, in the
absence of other factors constituting bad faith, may not be fatal to the
insurer's defense. American Sur. Co. v. Schneider & Son, 307 S.W.2d 192
(Ky. Ct. App. 1957).
44 Roberts v. American Fire & Cas. Co., 89 F. Supp. 827 (M.D. Tenn.
1950).
45 Noshey v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 69 F.2d 808 (6th Cir. 1934).
46 Johnson v. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co., 109 Vt. 481, 1 A.2d 817 (1938).
47245 Wis. 597, 15 N.W.2d 834 (1944).
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New York's Rule Establishing "Bad Faith"
Under early New York cases, the insurer was afforded almost
absolute discretion in deciding whether to settle claims so that
even a reckless refusal to compromise, short of fraud, was not
actionable.4 Apparently, the first erosion of the virtual immunity
afforded insurance companies with respect to their conduct in
handling claims against their policy holders occurred in Brassil v.
Maryland Casualty Co.4 9  There, the insured had successfully
prosecuted an appeal from an adverse judgment after the insurer
had refused to do so. In a suit by the insured for the expenses
of the appeal, the Court found that, under the circumstances where
the insurer had first defended the insured and after an adverse
judgment had refused to pursue a meritorious appeal, it had failed
to carry out its contractual obligations in good faith.
Also, in Schencke Piano Co. v. Philadelphia Casualty Co.,50
the Court of Appeals apparently adhered to the concept of good
faith. Subsequent to an adverse judgment against the insured,
the company, over the insured's protests, had initiated an appeal
which was ultimately successful in that a new trial was granted.
Upon the second trial, the injured party recovered a judgment
in excess of the policy coverage. The Court, allowing the insured
to recover only costs of the trial, directed a verdict for the insurer,
holding that, in the absence of proper allegations of fraud or bad
faith, the insurer could not be held liable for any excess judgment.
Despite this requirement of good faith, McAlleenan v. Mas-
sachusetts Bonding & Insurance Co.51 indicated that New York
law still afforded the insurer complete discretion in deciding
whether to compromise claims against its insured. The insured
and the injured party had reached an agreement whereby the
injured party would accept $3,750 in consideration of reducing
any verdict against the insured to the $5,000 policy limit. Although
the insured was willing to pay the settlement himself and the
insurer would thus not have had its liability increased, the insurer
refused to acquiesce, warning that it would consider the insurance
48 McAlleenan v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 173 App. Div. 100,
159 N.Y.S. 401 (1st Dep't), aff'd nem., 219 N.Y. 563, 114 N.E. 114 (1916);
Levin v. New England Cas. Co., 101 Misc. 402, 166 N.Y.S. 1055 (Sup. Ct.
1917), aff'd, 187 App. Div. 935, 174 N.Y.S. 910 (1st Dep't 1919), aff'd,
233 N.Y. 631, 135 N.E. 948 (1922); cf. Silverstein v. Standard Acc. Ins.
Co., 175 App. Div. 639, 162 N.Y.S. 601 (1st Dep't 1916).
49210 N.Y. 235, 104 N.E. 622 (1914).50216 N.Y. 662, 110 N.E. 1049 (1915) (per curian). For the facts
of Schencke, see Streat Coal Co. v. Frankfort Gen. Ins. Co., 237 N.Y.
60, 142 N.E. 352 (1923).
51 173 App. Div. 100, 159 N.Y.S. 401 (1st Dep't), aff'd inem., 219 N.Y.
563, 114 N.E. 114 (1916).
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contract breached if the insured went through with the compromise.
In an action by the insured for the judgment in excess of the
policy coverage, it was held that since, under the insurance con-
tract, the insured had foregone all rights to settle the claim, the
refusal of the insurer to allow the compromise, even where no
risk of increased liability to the insurer was present, was not
actionable.
In addition, the views presented by Levisn v. New England
Casualty Co. 5 2 and Brunswick Realty Co. v. Frankfurt Insurance
Co.5 3 illustrate the confusion that existed as to when liability
should be imposed under the insurance contract. In Brunswick,
the insured alleged that the defendant refused to carry out its
implied obligation of good faith by refusing, when. an excess
judgment was apparent, to accept a compromise offer. The court,
realizing the absolute control of the insurer in effecting a settle-
ment offer, held that the complaint sufficiently alleged facts upon
which a finding of "bad faith" could be predicated. Relying on
Brassil, the court stated:
While the defendant has the right to consult what it deemed to be
its own interest in making a settlement, it could not abuse the power
vested in it and recklessly and contumaciously refuse to settle if it
was apparent that in all reasonable probability its conduct must not
only result in damage to the [insured], but also in loss to itself.5 4
In Levin, the insurer, after several unsuccessful attempts to
effect a settlement, was finally extended a compromise demand.
Although the policy coverage was $5,000, the insurer refused to
pay more than $2,400 of the $3,150 demand. The insured, upon
payment of the difference, sought reimbursement from the insurer
on the ground that he was coerced into paying because of fear
of a judgment greatly in excess of the policy limit. The court
reversed a lower court determination in favor of the insured
and directed a dismissal of the insured's complaint. Rejecting
the claim of coercion, the court held the defendant-insurer had
been under no duty to settle. Making no mention of the Brassil
case, the court implied that only when the insurer litigates the
issue of the insured's liability may his absolute discretionary
power be questioned under the "bad faith" rule. Thus, although
the insurance contract was ineffectual in protecting the insured's
interests, absent fraud or coercion, the insured had no cause of
52 101 Misc. 402, 166 N.Y.S. 1053 (Sup. Ct 1917), aff'd mere., 187 App.
Div. 935, 174 N.Y.S. 910 (1st Dep't 1919), aff'd nem., 233 N.Y. 631, 135
N.E. 948 (1922).
&3 99 Misc. 639, 166 N.Y.S. 36 (Sup. Ct. 1917).
54 1d. at 642, 166 N.Y.S. at 38.
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action against the insurer if both parties had accepted and paid
the settlement demand.
Furthermore, in Auerbach v. Maryland Casualty Co.,55 the
insurer had conditioned its acceptance of a settlement agreement
which exceeded the policy limit by $1,500 upon the contribution
to the compromise of $3,000 by the insured. The insured refused
and a judgment far in excess of the insurance coverage was
rendered against him. In a suit by the insured for the judgment
in excess of the policy coverage, the New York Court of Appeals
held that the complaint failed to state a cause of action since the
insurance company was within its rights in refusing to settle and,
in the absence of allegations of negligence, fraud or misrepresenta-
tion on the part of the insurer, the insured could not recover.
The Court stated that the McAlleenan case was indistinguishable
while it failed to mention the Brassil case.56
It was in Best Building Ca. v. Employers Liability Assurance
Corp57 that the New York Court of Appeals finally decided what
is today the New York rule governing insurer liability for failure
to settle within the insured's policy limits. There, the insurer re-
fused to accept a settlement demand of $8,500, offering only
$6,500 while the policy coverage was $10,000. The insured,
alleging negligence in that he was never given notice of the offer,
stated that had he known of the possibility of compromise, he
would have readily paid the $2,000 difference. Reaffirming the
position in Auerbach that the insurer is not under an absolute
duty to negotiate settlement, the Court rejected the contention
that liability could be imposed for the insurer's negligent conduct.
Negligence, the Court stated, is a term difficult to define when
related to the insurance contract. Thus, the insurance company
should not have "to determine at its peril whether reasonable-
minded men would believe the plaintiff's witnesses in preference
to its own. ... " 58
While rejecting negligence as a basis for liability, the Court
approved the earlier cases holding the insurer liable for fraud
or "bad faith." Although not necessary for its decision, the Court
55236 N.Y. 247, 140 N.E. 577 (1923).
56 It is important to note that although Alterbach referred to possible
liability for negligent failure to settle within the policy limits, the point
was not settled. Moreover, an opposing view was apparently expressed
earlier in Schencke where, although the complaint alleged negligence, the
Court of Appeals affirmed a judgment for the insured for partial costs
only, stating that the complaint was insufficient because of failure to allege
fraud or "bad faith." Schencke Piano Co. v. Philadelphia Cas. Co., 216
N.Y. 662, 110 N.E. 1049 (1915). For the facts of Schencke, see Streat
Coal Co. v. Frankfort Gen. Ins. Co., 237 N.Y. 60, 142 N.E. 352 (1923).
57247 N.Y. 451, 160 N.E. 911 (1928).5s Id. at 455, 160 N.E. at 912.
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reiterated the Brassil principle that there is an implied obligation
in the insurance contract by which the duty to exercise good faith
in deciding whether to settle a claim against its insured is imposed
upon the insurer.
Applicability of the New York "Bad Faith" Rule
The "bad faith" rule expressed in Best is now well recognized
as the law in New York. This may be illustrated by reference
to two federal cases applying New York law.
In Harris v. Standard Accident Insurance Co.,59 the injured
party brought an action against the insured who had $10,000
insurance coverage and his joint-tortfeasor who had only a $5,000
policy. Upon failure of the insurer to accept a compromise
demand unless the insured contributed the amount requested over
and above the coverage afforded his joint-tortfeasor, a verdict was
rendered for $105,000 against the co-defendants. The district
court, in allowing the insured to recover the full amount of the
unpaid judgment, premised its decision upon the Best rule and
found that defendants' refusal to settle was in "bad faith." The
court stated that "bad faith" was evidenced upon the facts before
it since "bad faith"
is most readily inferable when the severity of the plaintiff's injuries
is such that any verdict against the insured is likely to be greatly in
excess of the policy limits, and further when the facts [as in the case
at bar] indicate that the defendant's verdict on the issue of liability is
doubtful.60
In addition, the fact that the co-defendants' insurance company
had been willing to contribute the full amount of its coverage to
a settlement offer appeared to further justify the decision that
the insurer had acted in "bad faith."
In Brown v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,6'
the co-defendants were holders of an insurance policy affording
coverage of $10,000 for each person injured and a $20,000 total
for each accident. After settlement with two of the four injured
persons, the remaining claimants commenced an action against the
insured and secured judgments totaling $45,000. The insured,
seeking reimbursement, alleged that the insurance company failed
to negotiate the settlement overtures in good faith. Holding the
evidence of "bad faith" sufficient to warrant a jury investigation,
the court stated that in "the absence of a clear, recent pronounce-
z9191 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
GoId. at 540.
61 314 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1963).
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ment on the subject, we are convinced that the good-faith
settlement standard controls in New York. . . . [T]he opinion of
the highest state tribunal in the Best Building Co. case comports
with the modern trend of the law." 62 Thus, failure fo consider
the insured's interest as well as its own when making decisions
as to settlement, failure to properly investigate the circumstances
of the accident to ascertain the evidence against the insured, and
recurrent negligence on the part of the carrier, were all considered
by the court as factors which could lead to a conclusion of in-
surer "bad faith." 63
Evaluation of the "Bad Faith" Rule
It is necessary to reemphasize that no one of the factors which
contribute to a showing of "bad faith" on the part of the insurer
in refusing to settle a claim against the insured is to be considered
controlling in determining the insurer's liability. Not only does
the law vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction but, in addition,
within a single jurisdiction, the conclusion reached in any case
will vary with the presence or absence of the several factors in-
dicating a lack of good faith on the part of the insurer.64
In New York, the sui generis nature of the determinations
is unquestionable. Not only is the Best case the last Court of
Appeals decision to have ruled on the "bad faith" issue but even
on the appellate division level there seems to be reluctance to
deal with the matter. Thus, in Chili Avenue Garage v. Empire
Mutual Insurance Co.,6 5 the appellate division reaffirmed the
lower court's order dismissing the insured's complaint without stating
an opinion concerning the allegation of "bad faith" made by the
insured.
One of the reasons why the "bad faith" test was employed was
to avoid the problem arising under the negligence test of deter-
mining whether the insurer has, in refusing to compromise, made
a reasonable business decision under the circumstances. How-
62 Id. at 678.
63 Id. at 680. The most recent New York case concerned with the good
faith issue is Cappano v. Phoenix Assurance Co., 28 App. Div. 2d 639,
280 N.Y.S.2d 695 (4th Dep't 1967), where the court held that the trial
court had erred in defining good faith settlement standards by charging as
elements: a sinister motive; guilty knowledge; and the deliberate doing of
something the actor knew to be wrong.64 See, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Price, 206 Va. 749, 146 S.E.2d 220(1966), where, although the insurer had refused to accept both compromise
offers and counsel's recommendation to settle, the court held such action to
be in good faith since the insurer's proper investigation substantiated his
belief that the insured was not negligent.65 Record on Appeal, at 193, Chili Ave. Garage v. Empire Miut. Ins. Co.,
24 App. Div. 2d 1080 (4th Dep't 1965).
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ever, experience has shown that it is just as difficult for the jury
to decide whether a refusal to settle was in "bad faith" by refer-
ence to vague notions of "good faith" or "reasonableness." 66
Given that the "bad faith" test presents serious obstacles to
a reasoned determination of insurer liability, is it possible to re-
solve this problem within the contractual relationship of the parties?
At the outset, it seems clear that attempts by the insurer to con-
tractually limit its liability for "bad faith" refusal to compromise
would violate public policy.67 Also, it would be of no avail for
the parties to attempt to eliminate the problem by having the in-
surance company obtain the insured's consent before rejecting any
proposed compromise agreement. The impracticability of this
proposal is evidenced by the fact that the insured could only lose
by consenting, since this would eliminate any possibility of pursu-
ing the insurer on a theory of "bad faith" refusal to settle. Thus,
the wise insured would consistently refuse to approve of the in-
surer's position." In addition, the type of contractual solution
found in Georgia Life Insurance Co. v. Mississippi Central Ry.'
may be eliminated. There, the insurance contract provided
that if the insurer elected to defend rather than settle within
the policy limits, the amount of coverage afforded the insured
would be doubled. The insured in that case was a large
railroad company which, because of its size and wealth, en-
joyed an equal bargaining position with the insurer. In con-
trast, the insured in most cases, because of his limited re-
sources, is in no position to bargain with the insurer for such
liberal coverage.7 0
Because of the failure of these alternatives to adequately cope
with the problem of the insurer's liability, the question then be-
comes whether there are any alternatives to the "bad faith" rule
which will present an effective and equitable means by which the
insured's and insurer's interests may be balanced. Having eliminated
the likelihood of amendment of the insurance contract by insurer-
insured agreement, the discussion inevitably turns toward a legisla-
tive solution. Should the insurer, in certain circumstances, be held
strictly liable for the excess amount over the policy limit if it re-
fuses to settle? It is proposed that this question be answered
affirmatively.
66 See Note, 13 U. Cr. L. R v. 105, 108-10 (1945).
67 See American Fid. & Cas. Co. v. G. A. Nichols Co., 173 F.2d 830
(10th Cir. 1949).
6s Comment, Insurer's Liability for Judgments Exceeding Policy Limits,
38 TEXAs L. REv. 233, 243 (1959).
69 116 Mdiss. 114, 76 So. 646 (1917).
7 0 Sce Note, supra note 66 at 109-10 (1945).
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In 1950, a bill which would have imposed strict liability on
the insurer was introduced before the New York State Legisla-
ture. It stated:
In any case where the insurer refuses or neglects to accept a bona
fide offer to settle the claim of an injured person or any other person
against the insured or his personal representative within the amount
of the applicable limit of the coverage under any such policy or con-
tract, then the insurer shall be liable for the full amount of any
subsequent settlement or judgment obtained upon such claim.7 1
The bill died in committee in both houses. It is possible that,
aside from adhering to the "bad faith" rule, insurance-oriented
legislators might have felt that if the insured desires more pro-
tection, he should obtain greater policy coverage.
7 2
The refusal of the New York State Legislature to adopt strict
liability standards should not, however, negate the possibility of
such adoption nor should it render one incapable of visualizing
the advantages, at times, inherent in a strict liability approach.
It is obvious that the insured (when insurance is not compulsory)
obtains coverage in order to be protected against the larger acci-
dent claims. The small claim is of very little significance to him
since its amount is usually equal to, if not less than, the amount
of premiums that the insured pays. Thus, when potential liability
is great, the insured's reason for having the coverage must be kept
in mind as must be the fact that the insurance contract is basically
for the insured's benefit. Since, under the insurance contract, the
insured has relinquished complete control in the handling of claims
against him to the insurer, if any money should be risked, it
should be the company's. Indeed, the fact that the insurer may
have been found to have acted in good faith will offer small con-
solation to the newly-indebted insured.
With a realization of the potential harm to the insured, the
Supreme Court of California, in Crisci v. Security Insurance Co., 73
has handed down what appears to be a landmark decision on the
issue of insurer liability. The reasoning of the court tends to
illustrate that statutory and case law requiring that the insurer
be strictly liable, at times, for failing to settle, may not be too far
71 Note, Insurance Company Liability for Failure to Settle, 2 SvRAcusE
L. REv. 112, 118 (1950). See also Dempsey, Excess Liability, 1950 INs.
L. J. 734, 747-48.
72 That obtaining greater insurance protection would alleviate the prob-
lem is questionable. No matter what coverage is afforded, the insurer
may still refuse to settle. To illustrate, what difference does it make if
the insured is covered for $10,000 or $20,000 if the suit is for $30,000 and
the insurer fails to settle for $8,000? In either event there may be excess
liability.
7 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
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away. Although the insurer had acted unreasonably, and it
was not necessary to impose strict liability, there was dictum to
the effect that the insurer may be held strictly responsible for the
amount of a judgment in excess of the policy limits if it refuses
to settle. According to the court, such a rule would not only
avoid litigation wherever a settlement was possible but would also
eliminate the insurer's "gambling" with the insured's money. In
addition, it was stated that whenever there appeared to be an
insurer-insured conflict, the insurer who will reap the benefits of
the determination not to settle should also bear the burdens of its
decision. Finally, on the facts before it, the court, in addition to
expressing the strict liability position, held the insurance company
liable for the mental suffering of the insured caused by the in-
surer's refusal to settle.
Conclusion
It is apparent that whether the insurer is liable for the amount
of a judgment in excess of the policy limits because it has acted
in "bad faith" is, oftentimes, extremely difficult to determine.
Unless the insurer has acted in a manner which evidences a total
disregard of the insured's interest, liability is dependent upon
whether the insurer has acted reasonably in the practice of its
business.
The strict liability approach attempts to avoid jury deter-
mination of this issue. However, strict liability, when applied to
all insurer-insured situations, also has its shortcomings. Indeed,
although the insurance contract is primarily for the protection of
the insured, the insurer also derives financial benefit. As such, it
would be inequitable to handicap the insurance business by making
the insurer liable when it honestly and reasonably believes that
it has acted in the best interests of the insured. Even in Crisci,
there is evidence that the insurer's liability should not be absolute.
The dictum of the court in that case indicates that strict liability
would only be imposed in certain situations, viz., when insurers,
pursuing a calculus of self-interest, abandon their policyholders to
the improvidence of chance.
When, therefore, should strict liability be imposed on the in-
surer? It is submitted that there are two instances upon which
the insurer should be strictly liable if it refuses to settle within
the policy limits: (1) when the pre-trial judge recommends that
the insurer settle for the amount proposed by the injured party,
and (2) when the insurer, instead of settling after an adverse judg-
ment, elects to appeal on some issue; procedural or otherwise, not
bearing upon the insured's liability to the injured party.
In jurisdictions such as New York where a pre-trial exami-
nation is conducted prior to actual trial, the pre-trial judge should
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be given authority to determine whether the insurer should accept
a compromise offer. And, in jurisdictions where pre-trial exami-
nations are not available, some type of hearing could be conducted
whereby selected and highly-qualified individuals would similarly
judge the merits of the insurer's defense. In making this deter-
mination, the questions of proper investigation by the insurer
and comparative financial risks should be carefully considered.
Under such a system, whenever the designated party con-
cludes that the insurer should compromise the claim rather
than litigate and the injured party is willing to accept an amount
within the policy limit, a refusal by the insurer to heed the recom-
mendation should render it strictly liable for any excess amount
of a subsequent judgment rendered against the insured.
If liability to the injured party has already been established
after a trial on the merits, and there are no substantial questions
as to the insured's liability which may provide the basis of an
appeal, the insurer should not be allowed with impunity to seek re-
versal of the judgment on a collateral issue which does not bear
directly on liability when the injured party is willing to negotiate
a settlement offer within the policy limit. Where the insurer
knows that the finder of fact has already decided against him on
the question of the insured's liability, it should not be able to
gamble the insured's money by seeking reversal on a technicality
in the hope that a subsequent trial on the issue of liability will
reach a different conclusion.
These proposals will limit the application of the "bad faith" rule
to litigation on the undetermined question of liability for which
the insurer has obtained official approval. Also limited would
be the confusion inherent in the "bad faith" rule, i.e., whether
the insurer reasonably considered the interests of the insured when
it failed to accept a settlement offer.
ATTORNEY'S WORK-PRODUCT PRIVILEGE IN THE FEDERAL COURTs
The "sporting theory of justice," which long prevailed in our
judicial system, has been rejected in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure relating to discovery.1 The purpose of the rules is to
assure a correct and speedy result on the merits. Discovery
facilitates this end in that it tends to narrow the issues; to leave
for trial only those issues actually contested; to insure that all
relevant evidence will be adduced at the trial; to expose fraudulent
and groundless claims; and to serve as a basis for pretrial settle-
' Tiedman v. American Pigment Corp., 253 F.2d 803, 808 (4th Cir. 1958).
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